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ABSTRACT
During the 1980s, many nations attempted to promote alternative fuels because of
energy security concerns incited by the oil crises in the 1970s. Countries which had
substantial technical and financial capability promoted synthetic fuels derived from non-
oil fossil resources to replace crude oil in conventional energy systems. However, with
the decline of world oil prices after the mid-1980s, most synthetic fuel projects became
infeasible and were either terminated or canceled. Returns from such huge investments
were minimal, if any. Consequently, the promotion of synthetic fuels in the 980 is
perceived as a failure today. New Zealand also promoted synthetic gasoline during the
1980s in order to reduce its dependence on imported oil. The synthetic gasoline process,
among other synthetic fuel processes, was known to be technically and economically
feasible. The process proved to be a technical success after its start-up in 1985 as it
supplied one-third of gasoline needs in the country. Although still in operation today, the
process has been uneconomical because oil prices remained low since 1986.
This research focuses on the general approaches the New Zealand government
used to promote alternative liquid fuels derived from indigenous natural gas resources as
substitutes for imported crude oil and oil products. Other alternative fuels that were
considered by the government included CNG, LPG and methanol. The research also
evaluates technology, policy and management aspects of the alternative fuels promotion.
Based on the evaluation, the snthetic gasoline process possessed the designed economic
performance standards. Hence, the main cause of the unsuccessful outcome was the
misjudgment in economic planning. The results of the sensitivity analysis show that the
same goals could be economically achieved by other means in theory. Therefore, the
synthetic gasoline might not be the optimal solution to the nation's energy security
concerns. The policy and management issues involved in the promotion also largely
influenced the success of each alternative fuel program. The overall results of the research
have implications for alternative fuels promotion in the future.
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1. INTRODUCTION SYNTHETIC FUELS AS ALTERNATIVE FUELS
1.1. Emergence of Synthetic Fuel Proiects
1. 1. 1. The oil crises and synthetic fuels
The oil crises in the 1970s alarmed many oil importing countries about
their energy and national security. Oil prices escalated from $3/barrel in 1972
to $30/barrel by the late 1970s, and peaked at $36/barrel in late 1980 as seen
in Figure 1-1. Oil was no longer a cheap and accessible energy supply as once
thought. As a result, nations began searching for the alternatives to crude oil.
On the basis of their domestic energy resources, each nation proposed a
strategy to remedy this perceived problem, but, not too surprisingly, they
came up with similar strategies - to synthesize fuels oil from alternative fuel
resources. This outcome was a direct consequence of the permeation of oil
used throughout the world.
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Many synthetic fuel projects were pursued during the period between
the late 1970s and the early 1980s. They were particularly significant in the
United States and Canada. With substantial coal and other non-oil fossil
reserves, financial resources and technical capabilities, these countries had a
strong potential for developing synthetic fuels. Also, many other nations in the
world attempted to promote synthetic fuel projects, and some industrialized
countries like Japan and West Germany began to develop their technologies to
enter a future competition of the synthetic fuels industry.
In most cases, synthetic fuel projects were conducted under the
administration of governments. These projects required anywhere from
hundred million to a few billion dollars in start-up, and the pvate energy
industries were not willing to take the risk alone to invest heavily in unproved
technologies into the uncertainties of the market without government support.
However, the promotion of synthetic fuels continued to be enhanced
because of the world wide anticipation that oil prices would continue to rise in
the future. Many oil economists predicted that the oil prices would be $40-
55/barrel by the mid- 1980s and continue upwards afterwards. In addition, the
possibility of oil scarcity in the near future, which was widely believed at the
time, supported the movement. With the hope for future technology
improvement, the economics of synthetic fuels production were regarded less
important, especially when national energy security was at stake.
1 12. History of synthetic fuels production (IPE, 19801)
The concept of producing man-made oil as alternative fuels is not a new
phenomena. Long before the post oil-crises rush of synthetic fuel projects
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occurred, humans have been using various kinds of synthetic fuels.
Experiments with synthetic fuels began more than 200 years ago, before the
discovery of flowing oil and gas deposits. Oil was refined from shale in England
in the late 1600s. By the late 1700s, paraffin wax, ammonia and varnish were
produced from shale all over Europe. In the 1800s, vegetable and animal fat
were replaced by shale oil for heating. In the United States, shale oil replaced
whale oil in the 1850s, and lasted until Pennsylvania oil discoveries provided
cheap and abundant kerosene in the 1880s.
In the early 1900s, coal conversion began in Germany, who had
abundant coal resources but little petroleum. Coal was liquefied by
hydrogenation under high-pressure by the Bergius process. In 1923, Franz
Fischer and Han Tropsch produced an oily liquid from a gas mixture, carbon
monoxide and hydrogen, from coal. The process, called Fischer-Tropsch
process today, was a noteworthy innovation, and has been the foundation of
gas liquefaction ever since.
Commercial-scale coal liquefaction plants were first built for political
and strategic purposes before and during World War II, and later by South
Aftica as energy security against economic sanctions. South Africa has been
producing liquid fuels using the Lurgi process to make gas from coal and the
Fischer-`Iropsch method to convert gas since 1957. In the United States,
there was an early attempt to develop a methanol-to-gasoline venture by the
private sector in Texas in the 1950s. At that time, the U.S. Bureau of Mines
suggested synthetic coal fuels as the solution during times petroleum shortage.
(Sperling, 1988)
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However, during the 1960s, this history of synthetic fuels seemed to be
interrupted by the outgrowth of cheap and abundant oil and its products.
Almost nothing was done during this period in the United States compared to
the 1950s. The U.S. government maintained coal research only on a virtual
starvation diet of about $ 10 million per year until the early 1970s. (Rose, 1986)
Synthetic fuels development was stagnant until the fuels were brought back
into the spotlight by the oil cses.
1. 1.3. The turning point
Synthetic fuels became promising fuels for the future around 1980.
Many energy industries' journals and magazines frequently reported the
progress of synthetic fuels as their feature stories in the early 1980s. At that
time, establishing synthetic fuels production and its industry was the key to
the energy security of the nations which were imported-oil dependent.
However, by the mid-1980s, the synthetic fuels enthusiasm was lost
since oil prices did not rise as expected. The difference between real and
expected prices began to increase as described in Figure 1-2. Investors began
to think that they would not be paid back for their massive investment in the
synthetic fuel projects, and canceled many projects which were in progress. In
1982 alone, more than 800,000 barrels/day of oil equivalent in coal gasification
projects slid from design engineering or planning stages into cancellation or
deferral. Ninety percent of all projects firmly planned were canceled or delayed
indefinitely. (OGJ, 1983b) Correspondingly, the plants already in operation were
confronted with uncertainty.
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Figure 12. World Oil Prices Projections, 1982-1990
Source: Energy Information Administration, 1982 Annual Energy Outlook.
DOE/EIA-0383(82), (Washington, D.C., 1982)
Then, finally the oil-coRapse in 1986, as in Figure 1-1, entirely eliminated
the remaining synthetic fuels fervor. Many more synthetic fuel projects were
terminated. Many plants in operation became subject to closure. The oil
industries in the world returned to their core business, oil refining and
marketing, once cheap and accessible crude oil was again available to
consumers. While there are still a few synthetic fuel facilities operating and
projects being undertaken today, the words "synthetic fuels" seems to have
disappeared from today's energy scene.
1.2. Future of Synthetic Fuels Promotion - Thesis Theme
Once oil prices fell, most synthetic fuels enthusiasm disappeared and
the projects were either canceled or scrapped. The billion dollar investments
10
around the world were therefore wasted. Many energy analysts see the
synthetic fuels promotion in the 1980s as a failure. This is certainly true for
those synthetic fuel projects which failed to operate and made no contribution
to the energy sector they belong to. However, questions remain:
- hat caused the failure of synthetic fuels promotion?
- Was the unexpected decline in oil prices the only problem?
- Were the synthetic fuel processes not feasible?
In order to look into these disputes, this research analyzes the
promotion of alternative fuels including synthetic fuels. Alternative fuels could
be defined in broader terms compared to synthetic fuels, as some of them, for
example natural gas, traditionally exist and are being used for other purposes.
New Zealand's liquid fuels promotion is chosen for this research because the
program promoted a synthetic gasoline project which proved to be technically
and economically feasible. Unproved synthetic fuels processes are not suitable
for this study. The synthetic gasoline project in New Zealand also produces
large enough volumes that it can supply one-third of gasoline needs in the
country, and, most importantly, is still in production today.
This paper will discuss promotion of synthetic gasoline as part of the
national liquid fuels promotion by the New Zealand government. The focus is
more on the overall approaches taken by the alternative fuels promoter, New
Zealand government in this case, than technology and economics aspects of
the synthetic gasoline production. The paper includes suggestions for future
alternative fuels promotion that have been derived from this study.
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2. 1. After the Oil Crises
2.1. 1. New Zealand's energy resources
New Zealand's indigenous primary energy resources are coal, natural
gas condensate, hydro power, geothermal water and a little uranium. Although
the country had been searching for commercial oil deposits for a nearly
century, no deposits could be found until 1980. The country, instead, has
plenty of gas in the Kapuni and Maui reserves.
The Kapuni gas reserves were discovered in 1959 at the offshore of
Taranaki. They were estimated to be about 600 billion ft3 of gas and
condensate in the early 1970s. The Maui gas/condensate field was discovered
in 1969 by Shell, BP and Todd. The reserves were estimated to be
approximately 56 trillion ft3, and were one of the 25 largest natural gas
reservoirs in the world. From these domestic gas reserves, New Zealand had
production of 150 million ft3/day of gas and 15,000 barrels/day of condensate in
1978. UEA, 1980) Figure 21 shows the locations of the Maui and Kapuni
reserves.
2.1.2. Energy scenes
The country is rich in hydroelectric power because lakes offer natural
reservoirs for hydroelectric power. From the early 1920s, the development of
state-owned hydroelectricity was conducted, and by 1930, the sale of cheap
2. ENERGY SCENES IN NEW ZEALAND
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Figure 2- 1. New Zealand energy developments
Source: (Lonergan, 1990)
domestic electricity was subsidized to some degree. Hydroelectric power now
accounts for over three-quarters of total electricity generation.
On the other hand, the subsidies for hydroelectric power prevented
natural gas and other energy supplies from growing for a long time. Gas
consumption, in fact, remained the same level for over 40 years until before
13
the 1980s. (Petroleum PS, 1970) Only the consumption of crude oil became
relatively large because of high rate of car ownership. More than 1.5 million
cars were owned by 3 million New Zealand people in the early 1980s - one of
the highest ownership rates in the world. (OGJ, 1983a)
The country therefore had a heavy reliance upon imported oil. With only
gas condensate available from the Maui and Kapuni fields, the oil consumption
of 40 million barrels/year needed to be imported. Consequently, the country
was severely damaged by the oil crises in the 1970s like other industrialized
countries. The oil crisis in 1973 forced a 5 percent cut in domestic petroleum
use. Gasoline stations were closed on weekends, speed limits were strictly
enforced. The allocation system for all oil products bit deeply into the lifestyle
of most people. Not surprisingly, the economy went into a long time recession
soon after the first crisis in 1973.
2.1.3. Energy policy
Until the 1970s, the government's interest in the domestic energy sector
had been to locate domestic oil resources. Private companies conducted this
task, but were unsuccessful. Hence, even the findings of big gas reserves, in
Kapuni and Maui, were disappointing results for the government. However,
this energy policy was forced to change after the oil crises. The focus then was
to increase domestic energy resources use to improve self-sufficiency. The
policy of the government was stated in the early 1980s as follows: (Boshier,
1984')
Through the 1950s and 1960s we fueled our economy on cheap imported
oil. This enabled us to enjoy economic and social progress and to develop
our way of life. The oil shocks of the 1970s brought home to us how
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vulnerable we are. In 1973, oil cost us 93 million, this year a massive
$1500 million, over 30 percent of our imported bill. While we remain
dependent on imported oil, the oil producing countries effectively
undermine our level of economic independence. The National Party
believes this is quite unacceptable to the people of New Zealand.
Our aim is to ensure an orderly transition from an economy dependent
on imported oil to an economy relying on our own diversified energy
resources. The long term goal is for New Zealand to be totally self-
sufficient in energy by the turn of the century.
The National Party, in charge of government at the time, strongly urged
the necessity of domestic energy resource development. The government
began the search for natural gas use in addition to domestic oil field
development. For this purpose, the Ministry of Energy formed a new state
company, the Petroleum Corporation of New Zealand (Petrocorp) in the late
1970s to take over government interests in oil and gas to enter joint
partnerships with the private sector. The company had three subsidiaries:
Offshore Mining Company, to look after the state's involvement in the Maui
natural gas project; the Natural Gas Corporation of New Zealand; and
Petrocorp, (Exploration), to explore for oil offshore.
Consequently, natural gas became a main energy supply for the future,
and use of the Maui reserves was urged since it was left undeveloped after
being found. For the use of the plentiful domestic gas, a number of projects and
proposals were made at that time. Initially, natural gas use for electric
generation was considered. However, it was not completely carried out due to
the lack of demand for additional electricity. The government began seeking
other ways to use surplus Maui gas, but the New Zealand market for
petrochemicals, then, was too small and liquefied natural gas (LNG) export
markets were considered too far away.
15
Meanwhile, there was a project in progress in 1979 to construct a plant
to produce 160,000 tonnes/year of ammonia-urea fertilizer. The government
also approved the design work on a 2500 tonnes/day methanol plant, to be on
operation by 1983-84, for a 15-85 blend with gasoline for automotive use.
Private companies, Shell-BP-Todd consortium, proposed a 100 million project
to produce 400,000 tonnes/year liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) for automotive
and other uses. (IPE, 1980)
2.1.4. Decision on synthetic gasoline
Among many proposals for natural gas use, Mobil's offer in 1976 caught
the New Zealand government's attention. The plan was to produce gasoline
from natural gas using a catalyst developed by Mobil. This synthetic gasoline
production could increase self-sufficiency and produce an exportable oil
product, and would gratify the government which as a sole customer for Maui
gas, was hoping to upgrade it into liquid fuels for domestic use and export.
Consequently, the synthetic gasoline (Synfuel) project, meeting the
government's energy policy, gradually grew into a big national venture.
In addition, the government's decision to proceed with the Synfuel
project was encouraged by the following: (Hooper, 1991a)
- There was a large amount of domestic natural gas which could meet
national requirements for a long time.
- The domestic energy sector was regulated, and thus gas and oil prices
were under the government's control.
- There was no alternative natural gas project that could provide the
same national benefits
16
Under these supportive circumstances, the government's involvement in the
project began to increase as it knew that no such a large venture would
proceed without the New Zealand government's intervention.
2.2. Svnthetic Gasoline Proiect
2.2.1. Planning and construction
Mobil's proposal in late 1976 was a NZ$200 million project to convert
Maui gas to gasoline at a rate which would rise to 57 million barrels/year. The
company estimated that gasoline could be made from natural gas at a price
that would cost no more than the consumer was paying for imported products.
The Mobil MTG (Methanol To Gasoline) process converts methanol to high
octane unleaded gasoline using a zeolite catalyst. The process, which would be
the first commercial production in the world, would supply one-third of the
domestic gasoline demand - 22% of its total fuel requirements in 1986, when
the plant was in full operation.
The project was finally approved by the government in late 1979. The
plan announced by the Ministry of Energy was to build a 530,000 tonnes/year
methanol-to-gasoline conversion plant with an estimated cost of US$445
million. The plant was to use about 50 billion ft3/year of natural gas to produce
13,000 barrels/day of high octane, low sulfur gasoline. The Mobil MTG process
was said to be able to produce a barrel of synthetic gasoline for US$23.00.
(Petroleum Econ., 1979)
Through a series of design sessions, the plant site was decided in
Motunui, 14 miles from New Plymouth, with a final cost estimation of 1.475
17
billion in 1985 dollars. The New Zealand government was to provide 206
million, while Mobil 69 million. Citicorp International Group, a consortium of
40 banks led by Citibank, financed the remainder with a standby overrun of
$550 million, which resulted in a total commitment of almost 2 billion. The
government owned 75% of the venture while Mobil had a 25% interest and
would manage the project. Project services were provided by Bechtel
Petroleum. (Wilhams, 1984)
Meanwhile, the opposition political party, the Labour Party, strongly
objected to the project on the ground that it was "too expensive", and
campaigned the during 1981 election with this appeal. (PIW, 1982) However,
the joint venture moved ahead as planned after the National Party's reelection
by a slim margin. The construction began in March 1982 with Mobil's consent,
and the New Zealand Synthetic Fuels Corp. NZSFC) was established for the
Synfuel project.
2.2.2. After the start-up
Despite the fact that the plant was the first commercial-scale
production of the new technology, construction was completed on time, July
1985, and the Motunui plant began operations in October 1985 as scheduled.
In addition, the construction costs ended up being 17% less than estimated.
(AUum, 1987) The construction was, therefore, recognized as successful. The
New Zealand Synthetic Fuels Corp. had made a desirable launch of its
operations. The plant also proved technically feasible, and had performed
better than expected. The designed capacity of 14,000 barrels/day of
production was attained by the early part of the following year, 1986, when the
18
plant was in full operation. Later, Mobil announced that the plant had
exceeded 13% of its design capacity in 1991. (Petroleum Econ., 1991b)
However, the government was already considering the possibility of
selling the plant due to the low oil prices after only a half year into its
operation. (Petroleum Econ., 1986) Because the production would be economical if
oil prices were at $28/barrels in 1980 dollars or above, the operation had never
been profitable as the oil pices remained for below this price. Besides, the oil-
collapse in early 1986 just a few months after the start-up, compounded the
problems seriously. While the plant was expected to save the country an
average of NZ$220 million/year in 1985 dollars in import oil expenses according
to NZSFC, it was, instead, churning a loss by the same amount or more due to
the production costs. McEldowney, 1985a)
At the same time, the national energy policy that supported the
production was altered after the National Party government was defeated in
the 1984 elections. The new Labour Party government proceeded to withdraw
fi-om further involvement in the energy sector, and hastened the privatization
of state-owned energy related companies. The state-owned Petrocorp, through
which the government had owned 70% of domestic oil and gas field explorations
and developments, was not an exception. Not surprisingly, the government
urged the unprofitable NZSFC.
The government sold the company to Petrocorp in 1990 for US$260
million, including US$150 million which Petrocorp had prepaid for existing
offshore gas supplies contract through 2009. OGJ, 1990) As Petrocorp at that
time was already sold to Fletcher Challenge Ltd., New Zealand's biggest
chemical company, the Motunui plant became detached from the government.
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Mobil, on the other hand, was not responsible for the investment capital debt,
and was in fact reaped a 16% return on the Synfuel production. However, the
company sold its interest to Fletcher Challenge in 1993 for 73 million, which
included the royalty payment to continue providing the necessary technical
support, as the plan to merge methanol interests of Fletcher Challenge and
Methanex Corp., a Canadian chemical company, became apparent. (OGJ, 1993)
Today, the Synfuel plant is in operation and is still producing one-third of
gasoline needs in New Zealand, even though its original owner and process-
designer have both left the corporate scene. Meanwhile, Methanex's purchase
of the plant was linked to the package deal consisting of the natural gas
supplies and the methanol production units in the plant, since the company,
the world's largest methanol company, is investing in the natural gas and
methanol businesses. (Methanex, 1992) Therefore, the future of the remains of
the big national project, now called the Methanex New Zealand Ltd. Motunui
plant, is unknown.
2.3. The 1980s and Now
The New Zealand government began promoting domestic energy
supplies since the late 1970s. The government spent NZ$750 million in 1983
dollars between 1983 and 1986 on oil exploration both on and off the country.
Using attractive packages and tax incentives, the government has encouraged
the private industry to develop oil fields. At the same time, a plan for increased
natural gas use was strongly promoted. Other than the Synfuel project, the
government had carried on the plan to use domestic gases in the form of
compressed natural gas (CNG) and LPG for transport fuels.
20
These efforts of developing domestic energy supplies showed good results
as shown in Figure 22. Four promising oil fields were found in the 1980s,
including the country's first commercial scale oil field, McKee in Taranaki,
which was discovered in 1980. The total domestic production today amounts
to 40,000 barrels/day and supplies about half of the total needs of the country.
(NZ Yearbook, 1992) The government also made progress in promoting the use of
LPG and CNG for automobile fuels since nearly 8% of the New Zealand
vehicles have converted to these fuels. About 10% of transport fuels demand
was met by 130,000 CNG vehicles and 3 by 40,000 LPG vehicles by 1986.
(Lonergan,1990)
As a whole, New Zealand's self-sufficiency in energy has changed
substantially since 980. There is a significant shift from the situation in the
early 1980s where 85% of the domestic oil supply was dependent on foreign oil.
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Figure 22. New Zealand: Oil and Gas Production
Source: Nfinistry of Commerce Energy Data File, June 1990
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New Zealand has achieved 60% self-sufficiency in petroleum products today by
promoting the domestic gas use. As Figure 23 shows, the pmary energy
supply significantly changed between 1973 and 1991. New Zealand's self-
sufficiency in energy reached 84% in 1990. Apparently, the synthetic gasoline
from the Synfuel plant contributed to this achievement.
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3.1. Natural Gas-To-Gasoline Process
3.1.1. Process Allum, 1987)
Figure 31 describes the flow of the natural gas to gasoline process. At
designed conditions, 52.5 PJ/year lpj=1012BTU) of natural gas is converted
to 570,000 tonnes/year of synthetic gasoline. Fundamentally, there are two
main processes involved in the synthetic gasoline production. Natural gas is
first converted to methanol using the Davy McKee/ICI technology. The
methanol is then converted into gasoline by a ZSM-5 zeolite catalyst, invented
by Mobil. This methanol to gasoline reaction is known as the Mobil MTG
(Methane To Gasoline) process.
Methanol can be derived from a blend of Maui and Kapuni gases. The
main steps in the process are desulfurization of the eed gas, steam reforming
to synthesis gas, compression and methanol synthesis. The methanol plant,
which is designed by Davy-McKee, is made up of two conversion units of which
capacity are 2200 tonnes/day each. The operation and the performance of the
methanol units is well understood from previous commercial experience.
Approximately 155,000 m3/hr 5.47 million ft3/hr) of natural gas is converted
to 6700 m3/day 0.24 million ft3/day) of crude methanol. The crude methanol
must be further processed if it is to be used as product methanol. However, it
can be fed to the MTG unit without such processing. Also the crude methanol
can be sent to the neighboring methanol plant for upgrading to chemical grade
methanol. Methanol production during 1990 totaled 17 million tonnes. The
methanol units stand as the largest single site methanol capacity in the world.
3 SNTHETIC GASOLINE PRODUCTION
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Conversion of methanol to gasoline occurs in two stages. First, the
crude methanol is partly dehydrated in a fixed bed reactor to an equilibrium
mixture of dimethyl ether DME), methanol and water. The DME mixture is
then combined with recycle gas and passed to the gasoline conversion AM
reactors where reactions to form gasoline take place. The methanol is
Figure 3 - . Natural gas to gasoline flow chart
Source: (OGJ, 1985)
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converted to approximately 44% hydrocarbons and 56% water. The
hydrocarbons yielded are in the gasoline boiling range, and contain mainly
isoparaffins, aromatics and olefins, and thus has a high octane number. The
ZSM-5 catalyst in the MTG reactors consists of a structure made of tiny holes
which have about a 6A diameter. This structure creates shape-selectivity,
preventing the production of hydrocarbons heavier than C1 1. The catalyst
ZSM-5 can be regenerated while on stream and has catalyst life excess of two
years.
The overall process has 57% thermal efficiency. The thermal efficiency
of the MTG reaction alone is 95%. The gasoline produced has at least 91
octane number, and is transferred to Port Taranaki by pipeline for either
shipping to the Marsden Point refinery for blending and distribution or for
export to overseas markets.
3.1.2. Infrastructure
Infrastructure of the production, such as the pipelines of feedstock,
product transfer and water supply, off-sites and utilities, was all supplied and
owned by the government A 0 inch diameter, 32.2 mile pipeline transports
synthetic gasoline at a rate of 19,500 barrels/day from the plant to the Omata
tank farm. An 18 inch, 2 mile loading line carries about 306,000 barrels/day of
the gasoline from Omata to Port Taranaki for shipment to the Marsden Point
refinery. Two supply pipelines, 24 inch and 12 inch, carry natural gas 33 miles
from Waitara to the plant for use as feedstock. Their combined capacity is
182 million ft3/day. (OGJ, 1983d) Figure 32 shows the location of the Synfuel
plant and the natural gas fields.
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Figure 32. Synfuel gas-to-gasoline plant location
Source: (Hooper, 1991a)
3.1.3. Technical feasibility
Prior to the start-up of Synfuel plant, both the New Zealand government
and Mobil were confident of their new venture as there was already evidence to
support the technical feasibility of the process This feature makes the Synfuel
project different from some of new technology ventures where optimistic views
of the planners about technology improvement does not match real technology
practicality, causing unsatisfactory outcome right from the start of operation.
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The Mobil MTG process, which was discovered and studied since the
1960s, showed technical feasibility during the 1970s. The construction of a
pilot plant began in 1980 in West Germany, by the West German and the U.S.
governments, Mobil, and West German operators and engineers. The fluid-bed
plant was completed in 1983 and successfully processed 100 barrels/day of
methanol to yield gasoline. The methanol-to-gasoline pilot plant surpassed
targeted production and converted 135 barrels/day of methanol into high
octane gasoline. OGJ, 1983d)
3.1.4. The MTG process among other synthetic fuel processes
Like many other newly introduced technologies, many synthetic fuel
technologies at the time of emergence were unproved and uneconomical. It is
therefore necessary to distinguish the practical processes from the promising
processes. The Synfuel process will be included in the former as well as
Malaysia's middle distillate synthesis yielding kerosene, gas oil, naphtha and
some wax from natural gas. Both processes are similar to oil refining
processes as equipment used in the both processes are similar to petroleum
hydrotreating. Also, both processes yield direct production of oil products
which is advantageous over synthetic crude production which requires further
refining steps to make high-quality oil end products. (Petroleum Econ., 1991a)
In comparison with other synthetic gasoline processes, the MTG
process in the Synfuel production also has great economical potential. The
AM process would give significant cost advantages over the Fischer-Tropsch
synthesis, another prominent process for synthetic gasoline. The expectation
before the start up of the Synfuel plant was that the plant would produce
gasoline at a cost of US30-3 1 O/liter in 1984 dollars, which is 12 o/liter less than
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Table 3 - 1. Typical properties of
finished MTG gasoline
Source: (OGJ, 1976)
Table 32. Properties of the Synthetic Gasoline
Source: (Hooper, 1991b)
the cost of imported gasoline. (Wilhams, 1984) For the case of methanol as a
fuel, gasoline by the AM process was the only interim production technique at
that time unless methanol could be used directly in engines designed for its use.
3.2. Product
The crude methanol
from the methanol units of the
Synfuel plant is a mixture of
83% methanol and 17% water.
Typical properties of synthetic
gasoline from the MTG process
are described by Mobil as in
Table 31. It consists of highly
branched paraffins, highly
branched olefins, naphthenes
and aromatics. The properties
of the synthetic gasoline from
the Synfuel plant shows
similarity except for the olefin
content which is lower, as in
Table 32. The synthetic
gasoline is mainly similar to oil
refined gasoline except that it
h a s I w e r aromatic
hydrocarbon content and
higher octane number. The
Components, wtO/o
Butanes
Alkylate
C5 + synthetic gasoline
Composition, vol %
Paraffins
Olefins
Naphthenes
Aromatics
Research octane
Clear
Reid vapor pressure, psig
Specific gravity
Sulfur, vAO/o
Nitrogen, wt%
2.7
3.2
94.1
100.0
5 1
3
8
2 
100
93
9.0
0.730
Nil
Nil
MTG Gasoline US Gasoline
Composition, vol %
Paraffins
Naphthenes
Olefins
Aromatics
(Including benzene)
Benzene
Specification
RON (Clear)
MON
Reid Vapor Pressure (mbar)
Specific Gravity
60.5
6.5
7.5
25.5
0.34
56-60
10-12
30-32
2.0
92
8 1
620min-862max
0.73
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higher octane number enables the synthetic gasoline to be used as lead-free
gasoline. It is also suitable for reformulated gasoline, cleaner gasoline for the
future, because of the low aromatic hydrocarbons, especially benzene.
Although there are no hydrocarbons heavier than C11, the AM
gasoline contains a relatively high proportion, approximately 2 of total
product in weight base, of durene (1 2 4 5-tetramethyl benzene), a heavy
aromatic. Because of its high melting point (790C), durene causes precipitation
in an engine's carburetor when used in gasoline, and thus has to be either
diluted or removed from the final product. The durene, however, is a potential
feedstock for the manufacture of pyromellitic dianhydride (PMDA) used in
polymide polymers, engineering plastics and for other high performance
applications, and can be sold to the petrochemical industry. Given the Synfuel
plant can produce as much as 35,000 tonnes/year of durene, the government
sought to use this by-product by constructing a 40,000 tonnes/ year PMDA
plant.
3.3. Proiect Costs
3.3. 1. Production costs
According to the New Zealand government's estimation, the project
could pay the full commercial price for natural gas, which was then
US$1.03/GJ, if crude oil prices remained above US$28/barrel in 1980 dollars
over the life of the venture. (Boshier, 19841) The oil price in 1980 was
US$36/barrel, and thus the project could even afford a decline in the oil prices.
The government's expectation also included an escalation in the net-profit with
oil price rises in the future.
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The actual 1988 financial situation and the 1990 costs of the natural
gas to gasoline conversion process are described in Table 33 and Table 34
respectively. As the Table 34 shows, the factor influencing the cost rise most
was "Full Investment Recovery." The rest of the operating costs, in fact, were
less than 60% of the total costs. Interestingly, the production costs without
the returns on investment are approximately equal to the total revenue.
These values are in accordance with the statement made by New Zealand
Synthetic Fuels Corp. before the plant start-up that the synthetic fuel project
would be economical as long as crude oil prices remain more than US$12/barrel
in 1984 dollars, since the average oil prices in 1989 were close to US$12/barrel
in 1984 dollars. (Williams, 1984)
The plant was operated on a tolling basis, which amounted to a fixed fee
per unit of feedstock processed. The natural gas feedstock and the gasoline
produced by the plant were both owned by the government, which thus took
the risks and benefits of fluctuating value of the product. Consequently, a
government subsidy was required to maintain the operation economical.
However, the venture was undertaken without such subsidy and was on a
project loan basis. (Hooper, 1991b) Synfuel production therefore lost nearly
NZ$350 million in 1988 as shown in Table 33.
3.3.2. Investment costs
There was a significant difference between the cost estimates of 1981
and 1984 because of a large increase in investment cost during the
construction period. The total capital cost including fees and startup costs was
initially estimated to be US$886 million in March 1980 terms. However, there
were an inflation allowance of 306 million and interests charges over the
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Table 33. Synfuel Project Financial Position 1988/89
Costs NZS million Revenues NZS million
Gas purchase 127.5 Gasoline sales 189.2
Fee to NZSFC 438.5 Other revenue 29.6
GGT operating expenses 24.0 NZSFC dividend 92.3
Stock movements 5.3
Interest charges 72.2
Totol costs 667.5 Total revenue before tax 311.1
Government loss on operations after interest and before tax 356.4
Energy resources lew foregone 25.8
Withholding tax (6.8)
Net loss to government 375.4
Source: (IEA, 1989)
Note: Report for the year ended 31st March 1989.
Table 34. Gas-To-Gasoline Costs, 1990
Cost Component Contribution Required Required Gasoline Selling Pce
(US$/bbl) (US$/bbl)
Variable Cost 13 13
Cash Cost 7 20
Debt Service Cost 15 35
Full Investment Recovery 30 65
Basis Gas Cost USSI.25/GJ gas
Plant Capacity 630,000 tonnes/year
Required Return I % real after tax
Source: (Hooper, 1991b)
3 1
construction period of 283 million. Therefore, the total cost summed up to
US$1.475 billion in 1985 dollars. The interest rate during this period was very
rapid and was recognized as 16%, which was the adjusted value for inflation of
New Zealand's 10% real rate of return for the public investment. (Boshier, 1984)
As the construction was completed at 17% under budget, the overall
investment costs became US$1.218 billion in 1985 dollars. The government
paid 200 million and loaned almost 1.7 billion from the Citicorp consortium.
As the loan was on 10 year term and the government could pay 0.5 billion
immediately, payments averaged 200 million per year over this period at a
16% discount rate adjusted for inflation. This value coincides with the full
investment recovery cost in Table 34. From the same table, the required
gasoline selling price for this cost was US$30/barrel, or N$0.33/liter. The
total required gasoline selling price of NZ$0.70/liter would be costly compared
to the domestic retail gasoline prices of NZ$0.52/liter after tax in the same
year. (IEA, 1993)
3.4. The Production To
Despite the government's prediction, world oil prices became
US$17/barrel by 1987, and continued to be at or below this level. As described
above, the government was losing more than NZ$350 million a year in 1988.
It also shows that gasoline sales had to be three times the actual sales to meet
the overall operational costs. However, the average gasoline prices in New
Zealand had only slight increases over the period of 1986 and 1992 as shown in
Table 35. Also, gasoline price in the world market did not show significant
increases except for the period of the Gulf crisis, as in Table 36. Thus, by
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Gasoline (NZS/liter)
Price Tax
1986 0.829 0.256
1987 0.899 0.445
1988 0.898 0.452
1989 0.904 0.425
1990 0.964 0.441
1991 0.998 0.453
1992 1.006 0.469
Source: (IEA, 1993)
Note: Prices are set by the government. Data between 1986 and 1989 are
reta'I gasoline prices. Data after 1990 are wholesale prices. Retail
prices are no longer collected on a national basis.
Table 36. Gasoline Spot Prices, 1986-1992 (Rotterdam)
US dollars/barrel
Source: Platt's
Table 35. Gasoline Prices in New Zaland. 1986-1992
simply estimating the process
costs and the revenues, the
government could possibly have
lost more than NZ$2 billion by
1992 if it had continued to own
the plant.
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
19.97
21.79
20.59
24.31
32.06
27.70
24.73
The Synfuel plant was eventually sold to a Canadian chemical
company, Methanex Co., after being sold to privatized Petrocorp. Apparently,
acquiring the methanol production capability of the plant was the main aim of
Methanex Co., because the company currently stands as the world's largest
producer of methanol, producing 16% of all chemical methanol in 1993.
However, the change of the owner provided the plant an ability to swing
production between gasoline and chemical grade methanol to take advantage
of relative pricing differences between the two products, since Methanex Co.
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also owns the neighboring methanol plant, as in Figure 33. (Methanex, 1992)
Yet, the company seems to place more emphasis on methanol production given
today's low oil prices, and plans to build an additional 2000 tonnes/day
methanol distiller which will subsequently reduce gasoline production.
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Figure 33. Motunui Plant Production
Source: (Methanex, 1992)
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4. 1. Liquid Fuels Promotion
4.1.1. Goals and the programs
In 1978, transport fuels was 75% of total oil consumption, which were
85% dependent on imported crude oil and oil products. (Hooper, 1991a) As a
consequence, the government decided to promote replacement of transport
fuels by liquid fuels from some indigenous energy resources in order to achieve
the nation's goals to decrease its imported oil dependence.
Major domestic energy resources included coal and gas. As shown in
Table 41, the coal reserves were estimated to be ten times larger than the gas
reserves in terms of energy potential. The use of coal, however, was declining
because of the high distribution costs and inconveniences in the handling and
use of coal. The situation was compounded by a take-or-pay" contract of the
Maui gas between the developers and the government. The contract, which
would run from 1978 through 2008, created an obligation for the government to
Table 4- 1. Recoverable Coal and Gas Reserves, 1980
Coal (million tonnes) Gas (trillion ft3)
Measured Indicated Inferred Total Reserve Gas/LPG Condensate
220 2170 1308 3698 Kapuni 0.47 0.13
Maui 5.18 0.39
Total 5.64 0.52
Proved Reserves 6,280PJ 5.64 trillion ft3 5,950PJ
Probable and Possible Reserves 58,600PJ
Source: (IEA, 1980)
4. ALTERNATE CHOICES
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use the resource. For these reasons, the government decided to use natural
gas alone for producing the liquid fuels. Together with Kapuni reserves, the
domestic natural gas was expected to be major energy supply for the next 30
years.
In order to proceed with the liquid fuel programs, the Liquid Fuels Trust
Board (LFTB) was formed by the Alinistry of Energy in 1978. The LTB was
funded by a levy on gasoline and diesel sales. The Nfinistry's energy goals
announced in the late 1970s also included policies which supported the liquid
fuels program: (IEA, 1980)
- to reduce its dependence on imported oil by the progressive
implementation of substitution measures selected to inimize increases
in the cost of energy supply
- to promote the effective and economic utilization of indigenous energy
resources which contribute to energy supply, assist economic growth,
and benefit export receipts
By proceeding with the policies above, the government expected a substantial
decrease in oil dependency by 1990.
4.1.2. Liquid fuel programs
The Liquid Fuels Trust Board examined and made recommendations to
make use of indigenous natural gas resources. Later, the programs to use gas
as a fuel were announced in the early 1980s. CNG, LPG and methanol had
been considered as alternative fuels as well as synthetic gasoline.
The CNG program was to introduce CNG vehicles to the North Island.
The targets were 150,000 vehicles by the end of 1985 and 200,000 by 1990 In
addition, 300 CNG outlets associated with gasoline stations were to be
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constructed assuming that each would serve 500 CNG vehicles. For this
purpose, taxation and financial incentives were provided to motorists and the
industry. Also, the minimum gasoline price controls existed. The conversion
investment was, hence, repaid within one or two years by the various
incentives and fuel savings though the cost of a conversion was about
NZ$1,500 in 1981 dollars. The government also converted its own vehicles as
many as possible. (IEA, 1981)
As a result, the number of vehicles converted to CNG increased
gradually as shown in Figure 41. (Sperhng, 19881) CNG had gained 10% of the
New Zealand market share in 1986, more than in any other country, even
though it was used only on the North Island where the Maui gas reserves were
available.
CNG Vehicles
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Figure 41. CNG Vehicle Conversions in New Zealand. 1979-1986
Source: (Sperling, 1988)
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The LPG program was also introduced at the same time as the CNG
program but at a lower level. It was a higher cost option than CNG, but LPG
was necessary for the South Island, as there was no gas pipeline connected to
the North Island to obtain CNG. The government expected that at the end of
the 1980 335 PJ of LPG would be consumed by automobiles 2.7% of total
automobile fuel use). Because of the increases in capital and operating costs,
the government provided assistance to the LPG distribution company in order
to assure a reasonable return as well as incentives similar to those of CNG.
(IEA, 198 1)
Meanwhile, Liquigas Ltd. was formed with Shell, BP and four local
companies as the main shareholders to make LPG available for transport
throughout the country as the government aggressively pursued the liquid fuel
programs. Liquigas tied to bing LPG to the South Island as the fuel had been
restricted to the North Island until the early 1980s. There was also private
investment in facilities to make CNG available for transport. (McEldowney,
1985b)
Methanol for transportation was another option for the country.
However, New Zealand had no domestic auto-manufacturing industry, and
dropped the idea of creating a methanol car due to technical difficulties. The
option of blending methanol with gasoline was also rejected by the Liquid Fuels
.Trust Board, which concluded it was uneconomical because of the much
greater value for methanol, which must be anhydrous for blending, as an
exportable energy commodity. Therefore, the methanol program remained
only as a research program to explore future opportunities. (IEA, 1981)
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The uses of natural gas were allocated as described in Figure 42 In
addition to the gas uses described above, an ammonia/urea plant began
production in 1979 with the capacity of 90,000 tons/year of ammonia to be
converted to 160,000 tons/year of urea fertilizer. Ethane was to be converted
to chemical products for export, such as polyethylene. Also, a plant to produce
1,200 tonnes/day of chemical methanol started operation. On the other hand,
another use of natural gas, LNG, was not endorsed. Converting gas to
methanol for shipping as an export product was preferred over LNG in terms of
economical and technical feasibilities.
The expansion plan of the Marsden Point refinery, the only domestic
refinery, was also closely related to the liquid fuel programs. The refinery's
capacity would be increased to 4000,000 tonnes/year of feedstock, which
I
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'Use of Maui, Kapuni gas reserves through 2008.. tReserves would be less by
2009 if second Maui platform were built and production increased.
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Figure 42. Maui Gas Use*
Source: (OGJ, 1982)
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4.1.3. Allocation of natural gas use
would sufficiently satisfy country's demands for major petroleum products till
2000. The new main process unit, a hydrocracker, would eliminate naphtha
and most refined product imports except gasoline, and would enable more
medium and heavy crude to be processed by the refinery while avoiding a fuel
oil surplus. The expansion by the mid-1986 was expected to diminish imports
of oil products to nearly zero.
4.1.4. Energy conservation programs
In addition to the liquid fuel programs, the government implemented a
number of measures to encourage energy conservation in the transportation
sector. (IEA, 1982)
- The introduction, in co-operation with the motor vehicle industry, of fuel
consumption labeling for new cars
- The development of a program which aims to market a package of fleet
management and fuel saving techniques to New Zealand vehicle fleet
managers.
- The assessment of the effectiveness of encouragement to motorists to
practice fuel efficient driving behavior.
- Encouragement for car pooling.
- The study of more efficient use of diesel in heavy transport.
- Financial support for urban transport systems.
Especially, New Zealand's graduated sales tax on new gasoline vehicles based
on engine size seems to have had a significant effect on improving vehicle fuel
economy. The trend toward larger vehicles seems to have been halted - in
1980, 91% of new car registrations were of vehicles of less than 2 liter engine
capacity compared to about 59% in 1973.
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4.2. Goverrunent's Choices
4.2. 1. CNG (Compressed Natural Gas)
CNG is the most direct application of natural gas among the gasoline
substitutes. The gas is compressed for fuel use because of its lower energy
intensity. A CNG vehicle was a new technology for New Zealand. Actually,
only Italy had made significant CNG vehicles conversion in the world before
the late 1970s. Its use as a transport fuel required a significant modification to
the automobile. Refueling stations also required high-pressure gas-storage
facilities and high pressure compressor units to attain the pressure for CNG.
Mchener, 1980)
The advantage of CNG compared to gasoline is that the fuel is clean-
burning, while the disadvantage of CNG is its low energy density. The typical
range of a car fueled with a CNG cylinder is 110 miles, and the car must,
therefore, operate close to the refueling area. In addition, CNG vehicles suffer
a slight power loss, and the usable space in the car is narrowed because of the
gas cylinders. Consumer preference, therefore, would favor gasoline vehicles
more unless CNG vehicles have significant incentives. Due to the additional
cost of installation, costing about NZ$1,500 in 1980 dollars each for CNG kits,
CNG was not economical in all vehicles, although its production cost was
relatively low among many non-conventional fuels.
4.2.2. LPG (Liquefied Petroleum Gas)
Like CNG vehicles, LPG vehicles have a relatively small driving range
and high cost, while having lower pollutant emissions. LPG technology has
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been more widely proven, and more than 25 million vehicles worldwide operate
on LPG mixtures today.
The total use of LPG in New Zealand had been growing rapidly.
Consumption had risen to 25,000 tonnes/year in 1981 and 40,000 tonnes/year
by 1984 from 1200 tonnes/year in 1971. The New Zealand LPG specification
is 80% propane and 20% butane which are available from natural gas liquids
contained in the gas stream. An LPG component is extracted from natural gas
before it is transported via pipelines. Therefore, LPG production is limited to a
small percentage of gas production. As a consequence, the government's
target of LPG conversion compared to CNG was low. CNG would be the main
fuel, while LPG would remain as complement to the CNG conversion for the
South Island.
4.2.3. Methanol and gasohol
There are mainly three different ways of using methanol as a motor fuel:
blending methanol into conventional motor fuels; use of pure methanol; and
conversion into gasoline. ixed with gasoline (gasohol), methanol can be used
without significant changes in vehicle fuel systems, while it cannot be used
with diesel fuels because it is a poor compressive ignition fuel. Methanol, also,
needs major vehicle modifications if used as a pure methanol fuel since it has
characteristics such as high corrosivity and poor lubricity. The advantages of
a methanol fuel are cooler and cleaner burning and higher octane property.
The disadvantages are that methanol is more expensive than gasoline and
methanol vehicles have a smaller driving range and poor engine ignition due to
low vapor pressure.
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Features of New Zealand liquid-fuel supply and distribution system
imposed major obstacles to wide use of methanol blends. Expensive cosolvents
were required because the distribution system was wet and the climate was
damp. Aldehyde emissions from methanol vehicles would also be detrimental
to New Zealand because the country did not have local pollution problems that
were caused by conventional vehicles.
4.3, Economic Feature of the Promotion
New Zealand government had significant control over domestic energy
supplies until the mid-1980s. Most of the energy pces were controlled by the
government at the time of the liquid fuel programs. Direct price control by the
government applied to gasoline, diesel, fuel oil and natural gas at all levels, and
electricity and coal at the wholesale level. herefore, the gasoline price relative
to CNG and LPG was always kept high so that CNG and LPG remained
attractive fuels over gasoline.
From the mid-1980s, the government began deregulating the nation's
energy sector and hence decontrolled energy prices. The government
announced its intention to adopt a more market-oriented approach in the 1985
Energy Plan. Consequently, the incentives to maintain differences between
CNG and LPG pces and gasoline price were cut back by the government As
in Table 42, the gasoline substitutes still showed a significant price advantage
over gasoline in 1989, but the ratio of gasoline to the gasoline substitutes,
especially CNG, decreased after abolition of the minimum gasoline price in
1987.
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For the CNG program, 50-60 CNG outlets associated with gasoline
stations could be built at a cost of about NZ$23 million in 1981 dollars. The
total capital cost of the CNG program, conversions of 150,000 vehicles by
1985, was estimated at NZ$285 million in 1981 dollars, of which NZ$60 million
represents infrastructure costs.
Table 42. National Average Retail Price of Gasoline, CNG and LPG - 1981 and 1989
(NZO/liter equivalent)
Gasoline CNG LPG Gasoline/CNG
1981 58 32 38 1.813
1989 90 56 61 1.607
Source: (1EA, 1981), (IEA, 1989)
4.4. In the Long Term
The goverrunent's plan of domestic gas use is described in Figure 43 In
1982, the government estimated that about 1.5 million vehicles out of a total
of 2.2 million could theoretically be converted to either CNG or LPG. (IEA, 1982)
However, CNG and LPG conversions were planned to be kept constant after
1990. Most of the current natural gas use would come to end in 2008, as the
Maui gas field was expected to be depleted by then, and the contract would
expire.
Unless further gas reserves are found, coal and geothermal energy is
expected to be the major energy supply of the country beyond 2010. Their
recoverable and potential resources are substantially larger than natural gas
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Figure 43: Uses for natural gas
Source: (Boshier, 1984)
Table 43. Domestic energy resources in New Zealand, 1990
Resource Recoverable Energy (PJ)
Coal 117,600
Gas 3,600
Geothermal 75,000
Source: (NZ Yearbook, 1992)
Notice: Geothermal energy in terms of hat stored above 80T.
reserves as in Table 43. New Zealand could therefore face another problem in
that it may need to promote new energy supplies, possibly alternative fuels
from coal, instead of natural gas.
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5.1. ReviewingtheLiquidFuelPrograms
5. 1. 1. Goals and the achievements
The goal of a substantial increase in self-sufficiency in energy was
achieved by 1990 as imported oil became approximately 50% of total oil supply
in the early 1990s. The country's dependence on oil in energy decreased to 28%
by 1991 from over 50% in 1973 as shown in Figure 5-1. Change and prediction
in the imported oil ratios are shown in Figure 52. Expected 45% imported oil
dependence in 1988 after the Synfuel start-up was also achieved as in Figure
5-2.
With the combination of synthetic gasoline, the use of CNG and LPG as
a fuel, and the production of condensate associate with the off-take of Maui and
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Figure 5-1. Percentage of Oil in Total Energy Supply
Source: (IEA, 1992)
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Figure 52. Percentage of Imported Oil in Total Oil Supply
Source: (1EA, 1992)
Kapuni gas, New Zealand achieved its goal of 50% self sufficiency in transport
fuels. (IPE, 1989) The Synfuel plant contributed to the national goals by
producing one-third of domestic gasoline consumed as oiginally planned.
5.1.2. Economic aspects - sensitivity analysis (1) 1
The 1988/89 financial data of the Synfuel process described in Table 33
shows that the operation cost US48.90/liter. This is equivalent to
US30.70/liter in 1980 dollars, and coincides with the Mobil's estimation
described previously. The Synfuel process therefore proved to perform both
technically and economically as designed.
In order to evaluate economics of the SynfLiel project, the net present
value (N-PV) of the project through its operating period will be necessary. From
I Notes and analyzed date are included in Appendix .
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Table 33, the Synfuel plant was known to be losing about NZ$350 million/year
around 1989. To estimate economics of the whole Synfuel project, a simple
sensitivity analysis is conducted for various rates of gasoline price (R') change
under certain assumptions and bases as follows.
Assumption:
(1) The government maintained the Synfuel plant and made the
repayment as planned.
(2) Rate of return, R, is 10% real and 16% adjusted for inflation, as
previously mentioned.
(3) Exchange rate of 1988, NZ$1.00=US$0.66
(4) Operating costs and revenues in 1988 described in Table 33 is the
basis for the Synfuel plant financial status, but the externalities, the
government loss on operations after interest and before tax, energy
resources levy forgone and withholding tax are not included.
(5) The loan had annual payments with an interest rate between 0.5%
and 075% above the London interbank rate. These loan interest
payments are assumed to be fully included in Table 33 costs.
(6) Cost component and bases in Table 34 are used for the plant
operation status.
(7) Gasoline pce is taken from Rotterdam petroleum product spot
prices.
(8) Gas cost was irrelevant to oil pice change as New Zealand had kept
gas price control, even after decontrol of gasoline prices.
Basis:
(1) The N-PV for the operation period from 1986 through 2003 is
estimated. This period was used for the government's estimation.
(2) The NPV of 1984 is estimated for the same reason as above.
(3) Estimations are conducted for the 1980 gasoline price and the 1984
gasoline price. 'Me ol price was high when the project was planned in
1980, and was beginning to decline just before the start-up in 1984.
Figure 53 show the result of the analysis. The actual rate of gasoline
price change from the Synfuel start-up till 1988 was about 13% real.
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Therefore the NPV of the Synfuel project would be approximately -NZ$3.0
billion if it was kept under the government. Since the total investment cost
was - N$1.218 billion in 1985 dollars, the project would still be losing $1.8
billion from operating costs alone.
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Figure 53. 1984 NPV of the Synfuel project
In order to profit from the project, R'must be more than 2% and 4 for
1980 and 1984 estimation respectively. Two different curves of 1980
estimation and 1984 estimation in Figure 53 explain that the project was
already in undesirable situation before its start-up because of the declined oil
prices, and thus, gasoline price between 1980 and 1984. The results of the
analysis in Table 5-1 show a similar trend to the assessment of the return
from the Synfuel venture released by Treasury of New Zealand in 1984,
described in Table 52.
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Table 5-1. 1980 and 1984 estimates of Synfuel by Analysis
(1984 NS millions - base year 1980)
Original 1980) estimate: Gas Cost
SI.I/GJ
NPV/year - 3 rising gasoline price case +198 (NPV total +3,569)
1984 estimates: Gas cost
$I.I/GJ
NPV/year - 210 falling gasoline prices case -96
NPV/year - constant gasoline pces case -67
NPV/vear - 2 rising gasoline pces case -32
Table 5-2. 1981 and 1984 estimates of Svnfuel y Treasury of New Zealand
(1984 NZS millions - base year 1980)
Original 1981) estimate: Gas Cost
S2.5/GJ
NPV/'year - 3% rising oil price case +147 (NPV total 2.646)
1984 estimates: Gas cost
S2,IGJ S2.5/GJ S3/GJ
NPVivear - 2 falling oil prices case -420 -550 -680
NPVvear - constant oil prices case -240 -360 -500
NPVyear - 2 rising oil prices case -100 -230 -360
Source: (McEldownev, 1985a)
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5.1.3. Same achievement without synthetic gasoline - sensitivity
analysis 2 2
Theoretically, there are a number of approaches that could result in the
same achievement, replacement of one third of gasoline, by the Synfuel
project. The New Zealand government's choices were:
- CNG
- LPG
- methanol
- gasohol (methanol and gasoline blend)
- fuels conservation program
The government could combine these choices to reach the same goals.
The estimation of the NPV by other means is conducted to evaluate
validity of the Synfuel project. However, the other means in this case are by
(1) CNG only, and 2) CNG and gasohol combination. LPG would not be large
enough quantitatively, while a methanol fuel would requh-e substantial vehicle
modifications which contained economic uncertainties. Fuels conservation
program is also excluded as its effect was not known precisely.
Therefore, CNG and CNG/gasohol are considered for the NPV
estimation. Again, analysis is conducted under the same assumptions and
bases as in the Synfuel project analysis. Additional assumptions and bases
are made as follows.
Assumption:
(1) CNG and CNG/gasohol conversion begins in 1981, as actual CNG
conversion started this year.
2 Notes and aalyzed date are included in Appendix 2.
5 1
(2) Gasohol is a mixture of 10% methanol and 90% gasoline. This was
the value New Zealand government thought as possible without
major vehicle modifications
(3) Methanol is supplied by the Petralgas methanol plant since 1983,
not from the Synfuel plant.
(4) Costs for gasohol infrastructure, e.g., blending facilities, are
neglected.
(5) CNG conversion can take place as many as 25,000 per year. This is
the actual largest increase rate between 1979 and 1986.
(6) US$34.8/barrel and US$ 1.0/barrel are used for the maximum and
minimum difference between methanol price and gasoline price
respectively, and are actual values observed between 1985 and
1991.
Basis:
(1) The costs for CNG conversion is taken from the government
estimation as described previously.
Figure 5-4 show the result of analysis for various rates of gasoline pice
change. All three cases, CNG, CNG/gasohol for maximum and minimum
premium of methanol, result in negative NPV at R'=-13%. However, all are
also better than Synfuel projects. In fact, CNG and CNG/gasohol at minimum
methanol premium have significantly better economics than the Synfuel
project. The analysis proves that the same achievement could be made
without synthetic gasoline, although replacement of one-third gasoline needs
would be accomplished later, 1996 for CNG and 1991 for CNG/gasohol.
CNG/gasohol combination is probably the best approach to satisfy both
economics and time criteria.
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Figure 54. 1984 NPV of Gasoline Substitutes 1980 estimates)
5.1.4. Technology issues involved in the decision-makings
Technology issues had a large influence over the decision by the New
Zealand government, as the domestic industries in the early 1980s were not
well prepared to implement new technologies. The country, therefore, made
decisions to leave programs with technical difficulties to be pursued in the
future.
Specifically, the reasons that synfuel was chosen over methanol was
not only the unsure market size and growth for methanol fuel as compared to
the certain and immediate market for synthetic fuels, but also technical
difFiculties due to the fact that New Zealand had no automotive manufacturing
industry. As new car sales were few - about 90,000 new cars per year in the
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early 1980s - the government was able to ask non-domestic car
manufacturers to produce methanol cars just for New Zealand's market.
Neither did it intend to entirely import methanol powered cars. (Sperling, 1988)
5.2. Policv and Management
5.2.1. Mismanagement in economic planning
The biggest cause of the Synfuel project's uneconomical result was the
continued decline of oil prices since the start-up of the plant. This unsuccessful
outcome is derived from economic mismanagement. Many oil-experts around
the early 1980s believed that the world oil prices would go up in the near future.
Those predictions were that oil prices to be US$40/barrel in 1990 and
US$45/barrel in 1995 in mid-1980 dollars. It was these incorrect theories that
led the government to invest in the unsuitable projeCt.3
In the case of the New Zealand government, there were three scenarios
for the 25-year commercial life of the project in the government white paper
presented by the Ministry of Energy. They are: (Hoskin, 1982)
- A base case with the project built to capital cost estimates of $US1,474
million - in mid-1980 dollars - and oil prices remaining unchanged at
about 32 a barrel
- A pessimistic case with capital costs rising to nearly 2,000 million while
oil prices average 10% below 1980 levels
- An optimistic case with the project built according to cost estimates and
oil prices increasing 3 a year
3 As in Figure 12, there were different predictions of future oil prices, but they all showed higher oil
prices in the near future.
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This study failed to show the economical unfeasibility of the project as
its worst case was still much higher than what really happened in the next five
years, almost 75% decrease in the oil value. Similarly, the business models,
developed at that time with respect to the Synfuel project's commercial
viability, also showed significant financial returns under most pricing
assumptions, but the most conceivable pessimistic case in the models was
only a 10% reduction in oil pices.
5.2.2. Effect of the goveriument policy
The initial stance of the government was to support energy promotion
positively due to its energy security concerns. Thus, a big project like Synfuel
plant, which was considered too big and risky for the private sector, was
pursued with strong government involvement. However, energy security was
not seen as an issue requiring special measures in New Zealand recently. The
government made decisions to end the Liquid Fuels Trust Board by 1987, and
to abolish the Afinistry of Energy in 1990 with its main policy responsibilities
absorbed into the b4inistry of Commerce. The government's interests seemed
to have changed to the promotion of an efficient private sector energy market
from the development of domestic energy under the government's guidance.
This change in the government's energy policy was related to the fact
that the ruling party shifted from the National Party to the Labour Party in
1984. The change in administration had a large influence as the two political
parties had significantly different approaches toward the national energy
policy. The Labour Party government proceeded to withdraw government
involvement in the energy sector and hastened deregulation and pvatization
of the domestic energy industry. However, these actions taken by the new
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government caused considerable confusion in the energy sector, as the rate of
deregulation and privatization seemed to be too fast. Equally, the Synfuel
production and the CNG vehicle conversions could not be successful under
such circumstances.
CNG and LPG consumption for automotive purposes was declining
slowly in 1988, and declined by 30% since 1985. The main factors causing the
CNG decline, as identified by a Nfinistry of Energy investigation, were: (IEA,
1989)
- the removal of CNG kits by used car dealers accounting for 52% of the
decline in CNG sales over the last 3 years;
- aging of the CNG fleet - 13%;
- natural attrition - %
Other factors included availability of gasoline at reasonable prices and the
withdrawal of government incentives which were very substantial in the early
1980s. The motorists were apparently losing interest in CNG vehicles due to
the lack of the incentives provided by the government.
For both the CNG and Synfuel projects, decontrol of energy prices
seemed to have a crucial impact. Until 1987, the New Zealand government
directly controlled most energy pces in addition to participating financially in
most energy activities. Prices of gasoline, diesel fuel, natural gas, and other
fuels are regulated by determining an allowable rate of return on investments.
In order to promote CNG, the government controlled gasoline prices to keep
the price of CNG at about half the price of gasoline. (IEA, 1982) However, with
the minimum gasoline price control abolished in February 1987, the New
Zealand government created relatively cheaper gasoline and higher CNG retail
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prices, which were unfavorable to both the Synfuel production and CNG
vehicle conversion as shown in Table 4-2.
5.3. Svnthetic Gasoline for the Future
5.3. 1. The policy required
The economic and technical factors, which needed to be taken into
account before its final decision in March 1982, should have included:
- uncertainty of future oil and gasoline prices
- validity of the project compared to other approaches to achieve same
goals
- feasibility of the new technology
- appropriateness of new technology in the long-term
Among the factors above, uncertainty of future oil and gasoline pces
has so far been the largest influence determining the success of the project,
while feasibility of the Synfuel technology has been proven. If the future of the
Synfuel plant were to be considered, validity of the project compared to other
methods would need to be examined. As already discussed, the choice from
synthetic gasoline, CNG and CNG/methanol would significantly affect the NPV
for replacing one-third of domestic gasoline needs. Also, appropriateness of the
Synfuel plant in the future would need to be carefully reevaluated before
making decision on how long the plant-life would be, especially in today's
growing concern for environment.
If the NPV of the Synfuel plant were not competitive to other means or
the plant would not last long enough to recover the loss already made, then the
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best strategy might be to fully utilize the methanol units of the plant, as the
Methanex New Zealand Ltd. seems to be trying to do today.
5.3.2. Necessity - the production today
The Synfuel plant today is supplying one-third of domestic gasoline
needs, comprising over 30% of domestic natural gas use in 1991 as described in
Figure 5-5. Its production is significantly large and is not an easy task to
replace in a short period by any other means except imported oil. As explained
above, CNG and LPG vehicle conversions may be theoretically more
economical approaches to replace one-third of the nation's gasoline needs, but
the rate of conversion will have to be extremely fast to reach such value any
time in the near future.
Replacing the synthetic gasoline by imported crude oil will not be
beneficial as this would lead to heavier oil products being produced in the
country where the usage of oil for purposes other than transportation is
minimal. Consequently, replacing synthetic gasoline would increase imported
OvWi*pm&xfion 33.0
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Figure 5-5. Natural Gas Market y End-Use, 1991
Source: (IEA, 1992)
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oil products which the government has managed to reduce substantially by
upgrading the domestic refinery. The Marsden Point refinery's expansion,
which was undertaken in the mid-1980s, has increased the refining capacities
of diesel and jet fuels but not gasoline, given production from the Synfuel plant.
These difficulties show that Synfuel, despite being uneconomical, has become
effective in New Zealand today.
New Zealand has kept only one oil refinery. Hence, the domestic
petroleum supply is in a vulnerable position once the refinery stops operation
If the Synfuel plant is upgraded and, thus, all the synthetic gasoline from the
plant requires no further treatment in the Marsden Point refinery, the country
may be able to have a plant as an emergency backup for the refinery at least
for gasoline.
In addition, the use of this high octane gasoline is in-line with the nation's
aim of promoting the consumption of unleaded gasoline for the environment,
where 70% of gasoline will be unleaded by 1995 from 31% in 1991, while the
properties of the synthetic gasoline exhibit a good potential for reformulated
gasoline for New Zealand. Sustaining the Synfuel production is also in support
of the global trend of using lighter oil products. The necessity of the Synfuel
today could be maintained in these aspects.
5.3.3. The role of the synthetic gasoline
Today, low oil dependence in New Zealand is about to increase. Between
1994 and 2000, New Zealand's energy consumption is expected to increase at
an annual rate of 16%, while oil consumption 20%. These figures were 21%
and 0.3% respectively in the early 1990s. The 1992 projections also indicate
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that oil imports will increase substantially from just over 50% of total oil
supply in 1991 to about 80% in 2005, as in Figure 56. (IEA, 1992)
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Figure 5-6. Percentage of Imported Oil in Total Oil Supply
Source: (1EA, 1992)
With the current low oil pices and the diminishing fear for oil depletion,
New Zealand's concerns over the supply of energy are gradually being
attenuated. However, if New Zealand were to continue with its objective of low
oil dependency, which was achieved through the energy policy in the 1980s,
then it should promote the use of domestic gas in the various energy sectors,
invest in energy technology for the future, and make a conscious effort to use
its energy resources as efficiently as possible. However, the country's self
sufficiency in energy sustained by the natural gas production is expected to
decline rapidly around 2005 with the depletion of the Maui gas field, as shown in
Figure 57. Therefore, New Zealand may have to promote new energy supplies,
given a similar situation as in the 1970s.
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The Synfuel project has, so far, been uneconomical and is likely to
remain so unless oil prices change dramatically. Future domestic oil prices will
largely be in-line with world oil prices while gas prices are expected to remain
constant in real terms for several years as New Zealand's gas distribution
system has grown extensively. Although the Synfuel plant continues to
operate, the debatable issue at hand is whether the government should invest
in similar projects which entail significant externality effects as the Synfuel
project. Perhaps the government should consider implementing energy
projects which would not be heavily affected by uncontrollable external factors.
In the long term, synthetic gasoline will become the vital link between
current fuels and future fuels. The New Zealand government's choice to
promote synthetic gasoline resulted in replacing imported oil in a short time,
while leaving the long term option wide open. The Synfuel project was
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discarded under the government's deregulation policy, and might not be a
failure after all. Nevertheless, the Synfuel project was perhaps not the
optimal solution to the nation's energy security concerns if energy security
means economics as well as self-sufficiency in energy. The project might have
been worthwhile in that it created New Zealand's domestic synthetic fuel
capability which could function as an alternative fuel supply should the need
arise, but it was not beneficial in that production capacity was developed in
circumstances where economic feasibility was only confirmed by inaccurate
predictions of future oil prices.
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6.1 Lessons from Synthetic Gasoline Promotion
6.1.1. True market value of oil
While the promotion of alternative fuels continues today mainly due to
environmental concerns, synthetic fuels receive less attention than in the
early 1980s due to low oil pices. Many synthetic fuel promotions of the 1980s
are recognized as a failure since they ended up wasting a huge amount of
investment capital. Like the case of the Synfuel plant in New Zealand, the
main causes of these unsuccessful outcomes were the unexpected oil price
decline and its collapse in 1986.
For practical synthetic fuel processes like the Synfuel process,
misjudgment of their economic feasibility prevented them from operating as a
major energy supply today. This misjudgment was derived from a belief among
many energy and oil economists that the oil prices at that time were held below
what should have been expected - the concept of "true market value." This
belief, which proved to be invalid, led to the prediction of continuous oil pice
increases in the future, and resulted in energy planners in both public and
private energy sectors promoting synthetic fuel projects on the higher oil price
prediction.
6.1.2. Replacement of oil by oil
Energy promoters in the 1980s seemed overly concerned with replacing
crude oil by creating man-made oil. Fuels like synthetic crude and gasoline
6. CONCLUSIONS
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were thought more effective and economical than non conventional fuels
because they could be used in conventional energy systems without almost
any modifications. However, energy promoters did not seem to realize that
these fuels would in fact be expensive without a proven and mature production
technology, even if the advantage of fuels' compatibility with conventional
systems was taken into account. As long as crude oil is accessible at ordinary
prices, the processes for these man-made oils will likely be producing fuels
which are otherwise available from crude oil refining at lower cost.
On the other hand, the possibility of oil scarcity due to depletion in the
near future was a common belief among energy and oil experts, and supported
the investments in synthetic fuel projects. The impact of the oil cses was so
large that it was probably difficult not to accept these arguments. At the
same time, many investments in unproved synthetic fuel projects, due to the
oil scarcity belief, implied that the energy planners at that time
unquestionably presumed future energy systems, especially transportation, to
continue using petroleum fuels.
6.1.3. Energy promotion and deregulation
Deregulation of the domestic energy system aggravated the situation for
the Synfuel production in New Zealand. The same could be said for the CNG
program. In fact, government control of the energy sector was included in the
conditions for the decision on the Synfuel project, as described previously.
Increases in the gasoline price were necessary for both projects. In general,
allowing higher conventional energy prices, is effective in introducing new
energy alternatives and promoting energy conservation. At the same time,
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implementing free market mechanisms for the energy sector may not be
compatible with the promotion of alternative fuels promotion.
Perhaps the New Zealand government's approach should have been to
acknowledge that alternative fuels offer long term public benefits in terms of
self-sufficiency in energy and, thus, deserve public support. Otherwise,
alternative fuels, including the synthetic gasoline, would have to meet the
normal conditions of the market place in today's situation of increasing
economic liberalization, and have to compete with ever-declining crude oil and
oil products today.
6.1.4. Energy security
Energy security is essential for any country, but it can be ambiguous in
meaning. Perhaps before promoting alternative fuels, the goal of energy
security should be clearly defined. Their approaches would then be different,
depending upon the relative weight given to economic or self-sufficiency goals.
For the case of New Zealand, the goal of energy security apparently shifted
from the latter to the former during the promotion phase. Likewise, many
governments in the world promoted alternative fuels without clarifying how
much their energy security was worth to the country because they were so
desperate to replace Afiddle East crude oil after the 1970 energy crises.
6.2. Conclusion
The contents of this paper is mainly based on the information published
and released publicly. Actual decision making procedures must involve many
other factors such as politics, culture and history, and thus are much more
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complex than described here. The intention of this research using simplified
analyses is to acquire rather generalized lessons for future alternative fuels
promotion using new technologies such as synthetic fuel processes.
The case of the Synfuel project shows the difficulties of promoting
alternative fuels to attain energy security. There were several fuels to choose
from, but the consequence of each choice was not easily foreseen. On the other
hand, some of the lessons from the Synfuel case address the approaches
necessary for future alternative fuels promotion. The case also verifies that
synthetic fuels with proven technology will be effective for various aspects
should the conditions be right.
Today, the reliance on oil is gradually increasing as oil has once again
become a cheap and accessible energy supply since the late 1980s.
Altemative fuels are being promoted today more because of environmental
concerns created by transportation fuels than from energy security concerns
of future energy supplies. It will be, in any case, important to follow the
lessons we have acquired from the last energy crises, as the world energy
situation today is reverting to the situation before the 1970 oil cises.
66
APPENDICES
ARvendix 1. Sensitivity Analysis )
A.M. Notes
Note:
(1) Rate of gasoline price change is chosen for Win the analysis rather
than rate of oi pice change since gasoline prices directly affect NPV
of the Synfuel project.
(2) Gasoline pice change can be related to oil pice change, but also
showed unrelated movements in the last 10 years. In this analysis,
the rate of gasoline pice change is simply assumed to be equal to the
rate of oil price change, when these rates are small.
(3) 'Me country benefited by reducing imported oil and oil products.
However, these benefits are not included in the NPVs as they are
foreign exchange saving and not the government's income.
A-1-2. Analyzed data
Table A-1. Example of aalyzed data (Synfuel project, 1980 estimates)
- Sensitivitv analysis (1)
(1-1) R10% 1980 est. R-
Year Discount R TotalCosts Revenues Gasoline Gasoline Gasoline Sale Net income 1984 PV
"'ZS m) (NZS m) (USC/1) (NZC/I) (NZS m) (NZS m) (NZS m)
R ---
0.17 _0.0809
i ao 27.20 --------------------------
1981 25.00 OSynfuel Project-base year ao
1982 22.98 ITotail NPV (NZS m -1 121:83 21. 11984 NPV (NZ$ _M) -1 79.67 1
84 I. 00 19.41 -- ---- --
19 1 10 17.84
19:6 1,21 590.2 109.6 16.40 24.85 214.S -266.2 -220.0
iga7 133 627.8 115.6 15.07 22.84 1 97.1 -31 5.1 -236.8
i a18 1.46 667.5 1 21 .9 13.86 20.99 189.2 -356.4 -243.4
1 gag 1.61 698.2 12a.s 12.74 19.30 166.5 -403.1 -250.3
1990 1. 77 730.6 135.6 11.71 17.74 153.1 -442.0 -249.S
199 1.95 764.7 143.0 10.76 630 140.7 -481.1 -246.9
199; 2.14 800.7 1SO.8 g.ag 14.98 129.3 -520.7 -242.9
1993 2.36 83a.7 1 9.0 9.09 13.77 i i s.a -560.9 -237.9
1994 2.S9 878.8 167.6 8.3 12.66 109.2 -601.9 -232.1
1995 2a5 92 1-0 176.a 7.6: 11.63 100.4 -643.: -225.7
1 996 314 5 199 1116.4 7.0 10.69 92.3 -241. -76.9
19 9 7 3.41 .42 . 196.6 6.49 9.83 a4.a -261.1 -75.6
1 998 MD 566.5 207. 3 5.96 9 03 78.0 -281.2 -74.0
1999 4.18 591.6 218.6 5.48 8.30 71.6 -301.4 -72.1
2000 4 59 1-2 230 .6 S.04 7.63 65.9 -321.8 -70.0
2001 5.0 64 24 .1 4.63 7.01 60.5 -342.6 -67.8
2002 5.56 67s.a 256.4 4.25 6.45 5S.6 -363.a -65.4
2003 6.12 706.9 270.4 3.91 5.93 51.1 -385.4 -63.0
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Table A-2. Example of analyzed data (Synfuel project, 1984 estimates)
- Sensitivity analysis (1)
(1-2) R10% 1984 *St. lt'-%
Year DiscountR TotalCosts Revenues Gasoline Gasoline Gasoline Sale Not Income 984 PV
(NZS rn) (NZ$ rn) (USC/1) (NZC/I) (NZS rn) (NZS m) (NZS rn)
R --- I r0.1 -0.0846
1980 r------------------------
1981 ,Synfuel Project b e 1980
982 ITotal NPV $ M)'15
983 I i
1984 1.00 19.73 ----------
1985 1.10 18.06
1986 1.21 S 90.2 109.6 1 6.53 25.OS 216.2 -264.4 -218.5
1987 1.33 627.8 1 1 S.6 1 S. 1 4 22.93 1 97.9 -314.3 -236.2
1988 1.46 667.S 121.9 1 3.86 20.99 139.2 -356.4 -243.4
1989 1.61 698.2 128.5 12.68 19.22 165.9 -403.8 -2SO.7
1990 1.77 730.6 13S.6 11.61 17.59 1S1.8 -443.2 -2SO.2
1 991 1.9s 764.7 143.0 10.63 16.10 139.0 -482.8 -247.8
1 992 2.14 800.7 1 50.8 9.73 14.74 127.2 -S22.8 -243.9
1993 2.36 a38.7 159.0 8.91 13.49 116.5 -S63.3 -238.9
1 994 2.59 878.8 167.6 8.1 S 12.35 106.6 -604.5 -233.1
199S 2.85 921.0 176.8 7.46 11.31 97.6 -646.6 -226.6
1996 3.14 S I 9.9 186.4 6.83 10.3S 89.3 -244.1 -77.8
1 997 3AS 542.6 196.6 6.25 9.48 81.8 -264.2 -76.5
1998 3.80 566.S 207.3 5.73 8.67 74.9 -284.3 .74.9
1 999 4.1 8 591.6 21 8.6 5.24 7.94 68.S -304.5 -72.9
2000 4.59 61 8.2 230.6 4.80 7.27 62.7 -324.9 -70.7
2001 5.05 646.2 243.1 4.39 6.65 57.4 -345.7 -68.4
2002 S.56 675.8 256.4 4.02 6.09 52.6 -366.8 -66.0
2003 6.12 706.9 270.4 3.68 S.58 48.1 -388.4 -63.S
Appendix 2 Sensitivity Analysis 2)
A.2. 1. Notes
Note:
(1) Methanol prices are shown in Table A-1. Methanol price changes
showed no relation to gasoline price changes between 1985 and 1991.
Therefore, ' um and minimum premium values of methanol
prices during the same period are chosen for the analysis.
Table A 1. Methanol and Gasoline Prices, 1985-1991
(US$/barrel)
Gasoline Methanol Methanol (gasoline equivalent) Methanol Premium
1985 31.96 17.08 34.28 2.32
1986 19.97 13.06 26.21 6.24
1987 21.79 13.56 27.22 5.43
1988 20.59 27.63 55.45 34.84
1989 24.31 15.95 32.01 7.7
1990 32-06 16.45 33.02 0.96
1991 27.70 20.10 40.34 12.64
Source: Mitsubishi Corp.
Note: Gasoline Prices, Rotterdam. Methanol Prices, US Gulf FOB.
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A.2.2. Analyzed data
Table A-3. Example of analyzed data (CNG only case)
- Sensitivity analysis 2)
----------------------------------------------------------
Year DiscountR CNGCws CNG Cars CNG Cars Gas Price Gas Price Gasoline Gasoline Gasoline GasCost PV
FuelCons. FuelCons. (Use/1) Price cost Earning/y
(tonn&Vaso) (TJ) (US$/CJ) (NZS/GJ) r (NZC/I) (NZS m) (NZ$ m) (NZS m)
0-10 F-00-809
1 980 0.68 27.20 41.22
1981 0.75 25000 39750 1684 0.78 1.17 2S.00 37.88 20.1 2.0 24.1
1 982 0.83 S0000 79SOO 3368 0.82 1.24 22.98 34.82 36.9 4.2 39.6
1983 0.91 75000 119250 5052 0.86 1.31 21.12 32.00 50.9 6.6 48.7
1984 1.00 100000 159000 6736 0.91 1.38 941 29.42 62.4 9.3 53.1
1 985 1.10 125000 1 98750 8420 0.96 1.45 784 27.04 71.6 12.2 54.0
1 986 1.21 1 S0000 238500 10104 1.01 1.53 16.40 24.85 79.0 1 5.5 S2.5
1 987 1.33 17SO00 278250 11788 1.07 1.61 1 S.07 22.84 84.7 19.0 49.4
98 1.46 200000 318000 13472 1.12 1.70 386 20.99 89.0 22.9 45.1
1989 1.61 225000 3S77SO 151 56 1.19 1.80 12.74 19.30 92.0 27.2 40.2
1990 1.77 2SO000 397500 16840 1.25 1.89 11.71 17.74 94.0 31.9 3S.1
1 991 1.95 275000 437250 18524 1.32 2.00 10.76 16.30 95.0 37.0 29.8
1992 2.14 300000 477000 20208 1.39 2.11 9.89 14.98 95.3 42.6 24.6
1993 2.36 325000 516750 21892 1.47 2.22 9.09 13.77 94.9 48.6 19.6
1994 2.59 3SO000 556500 23576 1.SS 2.34 8.35 12.66 93.9 55.2 14.9
1995 2.85 37SO00 596250 25259 1.63 2.47 7.68 11.63 92.5 62.4 1 05
1996 3.14 400000 636000 26943 1.72 2.60 7.06 10.69 90.7 70.2 6.5
1997 3.45 400000 636000 26943 1.81 2.7S 6.49 9.83 83.3 74.0 2.7
1998 3.80 400000 636000 26943 1.91 2.90 5.96 9.03 76.6 78.0 -0.4
1999 4.1 400000 636000 26943 2.02 3.05 5.48 8.30 70.4 82.3 -2.8
2000 4.59 400000 636000 26943 2.1 3 3.22 5.04 7.63 64.7 86.8 -4.8
2001 S.05 400000 636000 26943 2.24 3.40 4.63 7.01 59.5 91.5 -6.3
2002 5.56 400000 636000 26943 2.36 3.SB 4.25 6.45 54.7 96.5 -7.5
2003 6.12 400000 636000 26943 2.49 3.78 3.91 S.93 50.2 101.8 -8.4
(2-1) CNG Only R- IR- 0.10 ILLnj!cj- base year 1980 1984 Total NPV (NZ$ m) 1 -49115I - -------------------------------------------------
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